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Introduction
Corruption is widely seen as an obstacle to the process of development. It distorts prices and raises transaction costs leading to inefficiency in the system. The persistence of both petty and large-scale corruption is generally a consequence of poor rule of law, lack of transparency, accountability and regulations, but not restricted to these only. This makes measurement of corruption an extremely vexing exercise. We make an effort to measure the extent of corruption in the public sector. Our primary hypothesis is that consumption of durable commodities for certain groups are financed by income earned in the form of 'bribes'. 'Bribes', in our empirical and theoretical analyses serves as a generic form of undocumented income which confers a higher ability to consume, ceteris paribus. It is so because, additional purchasing power may come from unreported income (not amounting to bribes) including, but not limited to tax evasion, undocumented income from properties, capital gains as black money, or very differently from a lower propensity to save, higher discount rates, etc.
1 Clearly, the sources of undocumented income are interlinked and it is very difficult to isolate the point of origin, empirically. 2 The common perception is that certain groups, such as those in the public sector, accept bribes. It is also documented that non-public sector employees, such as those in the private sector at comparable positions to public sector officials (for example, the managers, CEOs, etc.) receive higher salaries, although, as we shall show, the wage gap is not monotonic across all positions. Everything else remaining same, it should then imply that for 'some' occupational types at least, consumption levels for 1 In many developing countries only a small number of formal units offer post-retirement benefits, such as pension. The relatively large non-formal labor market does not provide standard social security benefits to the workforce (see for example, Tzannatos and Roddis, 1998) . 2 For example, a public official paying bribes to another public official to undervalue an asset or property for saving property taxes or registration charges. 4 private sector workers should be higher than their public sector counterparts. Our empirical analysis investigates this hypothesis controlling for major sources of variations (such as job security, fringe benefits, pension provisions) that may potentially influence the correspondence between consumption gaps and wage gaps across public and private sector employees.
While India continues to be infamous for high levels of corruption in the public sector, the literature lacks credible analysis of its extent and depth. It is well known that public sector corruption in India has been historically facilitated by the so-called 'LicenseRaj' -a public instrument of economic control that epitomized the bureaucratic practice of red tapes and rent seeking (see for example, Saha 2000) . Despite industrial and trade reforms carried out in the country since early 1990s and subsequent delegation of governance to the grass-root level, i.e. the village 'panchayat' (local decentralized governance with subprovincial political and economic authority) 3 , the deep-seated phenomenon of greasing the palm for every economic activity continues. This motivates us to seek a comparison between private and public sector wages and additional income earned via bribes and how it affects consumption levels of the two groups. The empirical findings of our paper influence a brief but generalized theoretical formulation to offer a measure of the unaccounted for income level.
Essentially, both public and private sector employees display corrupt behavior in the Indian society where it concerns acceptance of bribes, kickbacks or tax evasion. We investigate if a gap exists between consumption levels of public and private sector employees in India and whether such difference is explained by the prevailing income gap (Glinskaya 3 See for example, Fisman and Gatti, (2002) on global relationships between decentralization and corruption. Also, Hilman and Krausz (2005) discuss the link between development failure and corruption. and Lokshin, 2007 documents public-private wage gap in India) between these two sectors.
We document a positive income gap at comparable positions, particularly in the upper tiers of occupation classifications, in favor of the private sector. It gets reversed for lower levels of occupational distribution, where public sector employees are better off due to provisions of minimum wages and other benefits. The job security generally seems much better for public sector workers in India. Thus, if employees in public sector earn lower wages than private sector workers at upper 'quantiles' and yet no perceptible difference in consumption level is observed, then it may hint at possibilities of additional unreported sources of income, ceteris paribus. The 'extra' income may come from interest bearing assets, investments, direct bequests, remittances, borrowings, etc. and 'bribes'. Our empirical section controls for some of these sources and investigates if 'unrecorded' bribes can explain the consumption pattern. 4 In this regard, our intellectual debt to a recent study by Gorodnichenko and Peter (2007) on corruption in Ukraine should be emphasized. However, the data set for measuring corruption in India has many limitations compared to other country studies (viz. Dreher, et al. 2007; Johnson et al., 2000; Mocan, 2004; van Rijckeghem and Weder, 2001, etc) .
Based on the empirical findings, we develop a theoretical model. It obtains the consumption levels of durable and non-durable goods for public and private sector workers from the direct utility functions. Our empirical result suggests that at the upper quantiles of income distribution, the private sector workers earn more and spend more on non-durable goods (accounting for living expenditures) than the public sector workers. However, expenditure on durable goods is not statistically different between these two groups. In most of the literature on permanent income and life cycle literature, it is argued that transitory income, in particular, is saved and distributed among all types of assets including durable goods. The response should be less for non-durable goods and services. However, according to Seater and Mariano (1985) , it is much more sensible for the consumer to use transitory income for purchase of financial assets, which have low transaction costs and do not suffer from the usual 'storage' problem associated with purchase of durable goods while following an optimal consumption path over lifecycle. Presently, we expect that transitory income in the form of unreported earnings buys financial assets, real estate and gold, all of which have a tendency to appreciate in value over time. Furthermore, non-reported earnings or black money are often spent on social functions like marriages, birthday parties, anniversaries, etc. Finally, corruption in economic literature is looked at from two very different angles. According to various cross-country cultural practices, it is either seen as a phenomenon that 'greases the wheel' or that which 'sands the wheel' of economic development. India continues to be one of the most corrupt nations in the world with a Corruption Perception Score (compiled by the Transparency International) of 3.3 (out of 10, with 10 meaning the least corrupt case) in 2010. India's nature of corruption, mostly seen as political, is a clear reflection of poor governance in the country. In addition the incidence of petty corruption being rather high for India, there is a clear case for measuring its impact on income and consumption, as this paper offers.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the empirical 5 The Income Tax Department of India collects information on such social events from time to time under the IT Act, 1961, provision -s.133A (5). However, in recent years collection of such information falls far short of desired levels and it is argued that the high inflation in the country (at 15% approximately during 2011) is partly fueled by purchase and hoarding of consumer goods with the help of black money. http://www.indianexpress.com/news/use-of-black-money-reason-for-inflation-pri/780701/ . Also see Singh (2008) for use of black money in India. 7 results. Section 3 develops the models and section 4 concludes.
Empirical Model and Results
Data Sources and Methodology
The data we use are taken from unit level survey data on Employment and This method can be used for estimating conditional quantile functions. In case of median regression number of positive and negative residuals that is, deviation of values from the median value is same. In case of other quantile regressions absolute deviations from the τP th P quantile will be asymmetric in nature. Different weights to positive and negative residuals will be attached in minimizing sum of absolute deviations from the τP 
Hypothesis
The hypothesis we intend to test is the following. If the durable consumption expenditure is same for employees across public and private sector units in spite of a positive wage gap between the public and private sector in favour of the former, then it may imply presence of a positive level of non-reported earnings. We argue that it fits rather well with accounts of bribes accepted by public sector employees in India. We begin by estimating the private-public wage gap. The Quantile regression method is used for estimating the publicprivate wage gap at different percentiles of the conditional wage distribution.
The equation is given by, four dummies indicating whether the individual has a full time job, whether the job contract is for more than three years, whether he/she is eligible for paid leave and whether he/she receives social security benefits. i u is the random disturbance term.
The results are presented in Table 2 . It indicates the presence of a positive and significant wage gap for the private sector over the public sector at the upper quantiles of wage distribution namely the 50P th P quantile and 75P th P quantile. However, the wage gap of private jobs over public sector jobs is negative and significant at the 25 th quantile. Public sector employees therefore earn higher wages than private sector employees for the low productive jobs but the wage gap reverses as one moves up the wage distribution. The results also show that the wage gap between public and private sector is highest among the most productive workers i.e. among the workers at the top quantile. The wage gap is -.166 log points at the 75 th quantile as compared to -.0421 log-points at 50 th quantile and .054 logpoints at the 25 th quantile.
The results are consistent with the findings from the literature on wage gap in transition economies (viz. Adamchick and Bedi (2000), Brainerd (2002) & Lokshin and Jovanovic (2003)). 7 Earlier papers examining the wage gap using quantile regression technique have provided evidence for an upward sloping private-public wage gap. The wage loss among public-sector employees has usually been found to be the highest at the upper tail of wage distribution.
Therefore, it is possible that significant consumption gaps exist between public and private sector employees at the top quantiles. If the evidence suggests that the consumption gap is not significantly different from zero, it must be financed by source of income other than wage earnings. Lower wages of public sector employees may be offset by presence of nonpecuniary benefits namely availability of fringe benefits and presence of greater job security.
Therefore, we have controlled for fringe benefits by including two dummies reflecting whether the person is eligible for paid leave and whether he receives social security benefits like pension so that the trade-off between present consumption and future consumption (present saving) is accounted for.
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The result however is in contrast to the result for developed countries where the private-public wage gap is usually found to be negative and significant (Mueller 1998 , Bender 2003 , Melly 2005 . Usually, public sector jobs provide more fringe benefits than private sector jobs and hence it is important to control for such benefits. Job security is controlled for by a dummy indicating whether one has a full-time job or not. Also our sample consists of regular salaried persons and hence the issue of job security is less of a concern. A much rigorous way of analyzing these issues is by looking at the quit rates of jobs. However, due to data limitations such an exercise could not be pursued here.
Information on consumption expenditure is available only at the household level.
Hence the main analysis for this paper is done at the household level. 
Here h w is the wages and salaries earned by all the family members who worked as regular salaried/ wage employees; 
The right hand side variables in the above equation are exactly the same as in the wage equation.
Results will be reported for wage and consumption expenditure gap for each of the three quantiles. namely the 25P Table 3 show that the marginal decrease in household wage earnings when one more member is employed in the public sector instead of being in the private sector is 0.128 log points for the upper tail and that the effect is significant. However, for the lowest quantile namely the 25P
there is a significant increase in household wage earning by 0.064 log points if one member switches from the public sector to the private sector and for the 50P th P quantile there is no significant change in household earnings if there is a switch from private to public sector. Table 4 on the other hand shows that for durable goods expenditure, the coefficient on pub h N is insignificant for all the quantiles of consumption expenditure distribution. In other words there is no significant gap in durable good consumption expenditure across the two sectors for all the quantiles.
The results in our paper therefore lend support to our hypothesis that the most productive public sector employees receive income from other sources, which may be in the 13 form of bribes. This should explain the positive wage gap between the private sector and public sector employees but without a significant gap in durable expenditure.
One may argue that job securities of the public sector employee are higher than that of private sector employee and as a result the marginal propensity to consume of private sector is lower than that of the public sector and thus there is no significant gap between the consumption expenditure of both the sectors. We tried to capture this aspect by controlling for paid leave eligibility dummy, social security dummy, full time dummy and job contract type dummy in our regression models. Again one can contradict our conclusions by pointing out that employees in different sectors with different levels of earnings may demonstrate same levels of consumption expenditure if private sector employees save more, pay higher taxes; conversely, public sector workers receive more transfers, such as subsidized housing, food supply, family pension, free schooling for children, etc. Due to paucity of such data, we will not be able to prove or disprove such claims. Nevertheless, the result at least hints at the possibility of such additional sources of income (or savings) flowing to a particular sector which is often ignored in India. Besides, we are looking at only one part of the total consumption expenditure namely expenditure on durable goods.
In order to strengthen our above claim, we also examined whether there is any gap in non-durable consumption expenditure between the two sectors. Results in Table 5 in the appendix show that there is a positive and significant gap in non-durable consumption expenditure between private sector and public sector for the uppermost quantile. Hence even though the family is earning more wage income and also spending more on nondurable goods if one more member gets employed in the private sector instead of being employed in the public sector, no such gap is observed in case of expenditure on durable goods. The unreported income is like the transitory income which is more likely to be spent on different assets including durable goods and less likely to be spent on non-durable goods.This result therefore indicates that the public sector employees receive some non-reported earnings which enable them to spend on durable goods at comparable levels of employment categories vis-à-vis private-sector employees. 
A Theoretical Model
The empirical result motivates us to offer a theoretical estimate of bribe or unaccounted for income earned by public sector workers. The dual labor market characteristic of a developing country is an important specification in this structure. The comparative static changes allow for labor adjustments in the large informal sector. The informal sector is defined as a low wage, high employment sector present in most developing and transition countries. It tends to accommodate a large number of workers at market clearing wages. Details on informal economics is available in Agenor and Montiel (1997) , Carruth and Oswald (1981) , Marjit (2003) , etc.
Consider a risk-neutral individual who maximizes an additive utility function
, subject to a budget constraint, It should be noted that this problem with 'pure consumption' in theoretical models vis-à-vis 'consumption expenditure' in empirical analyses is discussed in several places, including Seater and Mariano (1985) .
We bypass formal wage determination here, since it has been dealt with at great length in previous studies. See for example, Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004) . Marjit (2003) discusses determination of informal wage. It also discusses the distribution of workforce between formal and informal sectors in a typical developing country.
sector. A large number of workers settle for a fairly low wage in the informal sector. The wage determination leads to
Thus, the utility function for workers joining the public sector is given by:
where, α GD C is the consumption of 'durable' goods by those working in the public sector
C is the consumption of 'Non-Durable' goods by those working in the public sector;
is the propensity to consume D (consumer preferences are identical and homogeneous within each quantile).
G
λ is the marginal utility of income for those in the public sector. Let q be the probability that a public sector worker accepts bribe without getting apprehended; 1-q is the probability that he is caught and fired.T P
P T
In that case, the retrenched worker joins the informal sector and earns I w . β is the percentage of wage that comes as social security benefits to public sector workers. Finally, B represents all 'unreported' income including bribes. Thus, for the public sector workers income earned is:
On the other hand, for employees in the private sector,
is the direct utility attained by workers in the private sector maximized subject to the budget constraint:
Bribes accepted in cash or kind, tax evasion, etc. may cause suspension at the work place and subsequently job loss. Other forms of unreported income earned from undocumented property or business may also lead to suspension and job loss from public sector units if the person is apprehended or arrested on such grounds by other enforcement authorities.
For private sector workers, k stands for exogenous probability of job losses in the private sector; and T is lump-sum transfer/fringe benefits received by private sector employees; (1-k)
is the exogenous probability of losing jobs and joining the informal sector.
Without using the tools of standard maximization exercise it can be shown from these specifications that due to identical preferences the comparison will essentially be one between the constraints faced by each group. Nevertheless, the maximization problem (viz.
for public sector) may be written as:
The first order conditions solve for ) , (
Similarly, for the employees of the private sector consumption levels are given by:
Note that, our empirical findings suggest higher wage for private sector employees at the higher quantiles, and a consumption gap in terms of non-durable goods. The consumption of durable goods even at the highest quantile is however same across public and private sector employees. This suggests, , as we have argued earlier, suggests that the consumption of durable goods is equal across public and private sector workers and may have been financed by unreported income flowing to public sector employees. Therefore comparing (9) and (11) we get a level of such unreported income.
Expression (14) offers the level of unreported income flowing to public sector employees that helps to equate consumption levels (of durable goods) across public and private sector jobs. If the public and private sector workers take I w as given (we relax this assumption later), then the amount of bribes accepted goes up as the informal wage goes up (if, q > k). Similarly, higher is the private sector wage, higher is the bribe accepted, while it varies inversely with the public sector wage. Apart from the modeling specifications (bribes treated as compensating differential) that drive these results, it should also be readily interpretable intuitively. If consumption of durable goods and assets (like accommodation, household equipments, jewelry, etc) need to be quite similar at comparable occupational classifications across public and private sector, but wage incomes do not match, the usual recourse is unreported income. However, acceptance of bribes is subject to penalty that drives workers to the catchall informal sector. Thus, if the informal sector (for purely exogenous reasons) do offer a high wage then the threat of job loss due to acceptance of bribes would be low and consequently, the level of bribes should go up in equilibrium. An increase in the probability of apprehension also lowers equilibrium bribe unambiguously;
Interestingly, a comparison of (10) and (12) also offers an upper bound on how much the unreported income could be if the private sector workers consume more non-durable goods than the public sector workers. It is given by, Proof: As discussed above.
Finally, we relax the assumption on exogenous informal wage. We model wage determination in the informal sector in the following way. Let L be total employment in the formal sector. Then out of a total labor force ) (L , ) ( L L − works in the informal sector.
Homogeneity of labor force allows free mobility between formal and informal sectors.
According to our specifications, there is a continuous entry into the informal sector by
. This outflow from the formal sector includes probability of losing jobs from the public sector and private sector. Thus the rate of 'job acquisition' into the formal sector is the demand for 'formal' labor in the economy. One may find a similar treatment in Shapiro-Stiglitz (1984) where loss of formal jobs leads to unemployment with (a minimum) unemployment benefit. There is possibility of reentry into the employment pool given the rate of job creation. Unemployment benefits works poorly in most developing countries.
The informal sector on the other hand, is quite dynamic and adjusts to labor inflows and outflows spontaneously. Thus, we redefine 'job acquisition' a la Shapiro-Stiglitz (1984) as the outflow from and inflow into the informal sector. These must be equal and defined as 'a'.
. The relationship suggests that higher is 'a', i.e., as more workers get jobs in the formal sector the marginal productivity of labor rises in the informal sector and raises wage there. The opposite happens if 'a' is low due to greater entry into and lower exit from the informal sector.
Using (16), (17) and substituting in (14):
Note that, as the informal wage in now a function of k and q
Similarly, a rise in k will have opposing effects: the private sector wage and transfers compared to the effect of a change in k on informal wage. If the given private sector wage and transfer continues to be higher than the effect of k on the informal wage, equilibrium bribe must rise with a rise in k.
Concluding Remarks
Corruption among the public sector workers is very high in many countries. Recently, a number of studies have come up which document the level of corruption. One important finding of this literature is that bribes support consumption of durable and non-durable goods.
In fact, the evidence from some of the countries, like Ukraine show that the consumption gap between the low-income public sector workers and the high-income private sector workers is bridged by positive amounts of bribes. In the current paper, we start with a similar premise that everything else remaining constant, if there is a positive wage gap between private and public sector in favour of the former, then consumption levels for private sector workers should also be higher than their public sector counterparts. If that is not true, then the consumption expenditure parity hints at the possibility of some unreported income accruing to the public sector employees. We test this hypothesis for India using the NSSO data for the year 2004-05 and by applying a quantile regression method. The empirical results show that at upper quantiles of income distribution, the private sector workers earn more than the public sector workers . However expenditure on durable goods is not statistically different between these two groups of workers. 11 This therefore hints at the presence of unreported income earned by public sector employees.
The empirical section is followed by a brief theoretical exercise. The theoretical model 11 Private sector employees spend more on non-durable goods though. Expenditure on non-durable goods accounts for the daily necessities. The unreported income is like a transitory income which is spent on different types of assets including durable goods. Hence durable consumption expenditure parity hints at the presence of such unreported income. offers a measure of the equilibrium amount of bribe when the public sector workers and the private sector workers decide to self-select themselves into these sectors under different conditions of employment. In addition to the public and private sector, there is a third sector called the informal sector, where free labor mobility determines the market-clearing wage.
The outside opportunity replaces unemployment benefit in more celebrated models. The theoretical model comes up with a measure of an equilibrium level of bribes that help to cover the consumption gap between these workers and the private sector employees.
It is worth mentioning that our empirical results are in accordance with our hypothesis only for the uppermost quantile and not for the other quantiles. The results, therefore, do not strictly support the hypothesis that public sector employees receive large amount of bribes and spend the same on durable consumption. In fact, the lack of evidence might be strongly indicative of the presence of large amount of black money in the system, which are hoarded or invested in clandestine activities and instruments. This requires further empirical investigation beyond the scope of the current study. 
